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Existing compensation models typically assume that e¤ort has additive e¤ects on CEO
utility. This paper considers multiplicative specications for the principal-agent problem,
and further embeds the problem into a talent assignment model. The result is a uni-
ed framework endogenizing both incentives and total pay levels in competitive market
equilibrium. The predictions generated by multiplicative specications match a number
of stylized facts inconsistent with an additive model. First, the negative relationship
between the CEOs e¤ective equity stake and rm size can be quantitatively explained
by an optimal contracting model and thus need not reect rent extraction. Second, our
multiplicative setting predicts that the dollar change in wealth for a percentage change in
rm value, scaled by annual pay, is independent of rm size and thus a desirable empirical
measure. This independence is conrmed in the data. Third, incentive compensation is
e¤ective at solving large agency problems, such as strategy choice, but smaller issues such
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This paper presents a neoclassical model for CEO incentives and total pay, which yields
an optimal contracting benchmark against which current practices can be evaluated. Our
approach features two main departures from existing compensation models. First, motivated
by rst principles and intuitive plausibility, we introduce multiplicative preferences into the
principal-agent problem. The resulting empirical predictions match a number of stylized facts
that traditional additive models nd di¢ cult to reconcile with optimal contracting. Second,
while many existing models are partial equilibrium, taking the level of pay as given and focusing
on its optimal division into xed and performance-sensitive components, we endogenize total pay
in general equilibrium by embedding the principal-agent problem into a competitive assignment
model of CEO talent. The result is a parsimonious, unied model of incentives and total pay,
where both components of compensation are simultaneously and endogenously determined by
the market for scarce talent and the nature of the agency conict. The framework is tractable
and yields closed-form solutions. These give rise to testable predictions, which we validate
empirically.
The rst departure is our multiplicative specication for the costs and benets of e¤ort,
which contrasts with the linear functional forms commonly used. With multiplicative prefer-
ences, the utility gain from shirking and private benets is proportional to the CEOs wage.
The model thus treats private benets as a normal good, consistent with the treatment of most
goods and services in consumer theory. The share of total pay allocated to consumption and
leisure is independent of total salary, and so labor supply does not diverge over time as wages
change. This empirical consistency explains the common use of multiplicative preferences in
calibrated macroeconomic models (see, e.g., Cooley and Prescott (1995)).
With a multiplicative production function, e¤ort has a percentage e¤ect on rm value and
so the dollar benets of working are higher for larger rms. This assumption is plausible for
the majority of CEO actions which can be rolled outacross the entire rm, and thus have a
greater e¤ect in a larger company. For example, if the CEO designs a new method to reduce
production costs, this can be applied rmwide. Similarly, strategic choice or the launch of new
projects also a¤ect the whole rm.
If the production function is linear, e¤ort has little e¤ect in large rms. Thus it is optimal to
implement an interior level of e¤ort, to avoid exerting excessive costs on the manager (disutility
from e¤ort plus risk-bearing). In our multiplicative setting, under quite weak assumptions, it
is always e¢ cient to induce maximum e¤ort. This occurs because the cost of incentives is a
function of the CEOs wage, but the benets of e¤ort are a function of rm value, which is
substantially greater. Because maximum e¤ort is always optimal, the e¢ cient contract takes a
simple form. Since e¤ort has a percentage e¤ect on both rm value and utility, the percentage
change in pay for a percentage rm return is the relevant incentive measure, and it must be
su¢ ciently high to induce maximum e¤ort. Translated into real variables, this measure equals
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the proportion of total salary that is comprised of shares.1 If the CEOs salary doubles, the
dollar benets of shirking also double. His dollar equity stake must also double to maintain
incentive compatibility. Thus, the fraction of pay that must be composed of equity should be
constant across CEOs of di¤erent salaries.
By contrast, in an additive model, e¤ort has a xed dollar e¤ect on rm value and managerial
utility, and so the dollar change in pay for a dollar increase in rm value is the appropriate
measure (see, e.g., Jensen and Meckling (1976)). Dollar-dollar, rather than percent-percent
incentives, are relevant. In real variables, the former is the CEOs percentage equity stake in
the rm, and linear models predict that this should be constant across CEOs.
The above contract only gives equity compensation as a fraction of total pay. Our second
modeling contribution is to embed this principal-agent problem into general equilibrium to en-
dogenize total pay, allowing us to fully solve for the absolute level of incentives and generate
empirical predictions. We use the competitive talent assignment model of Gabaix and Landier
(2008), where the most skilled CEOs are matched with the largest rms and earn the highest
salaries. Since total pay varies with rm size, our model generates predictions for the rela-
tionship between incentives and rm size under rst-best contracting. Note that Gabaix and
Landier do not consider agency problems and thus make no predictions for CEO incentives.
The relationship between incentives and size is important for at least two reasons. It has
been widely documented that the CEOs e¤ective equity stake (dollar-dollar incentives) is
signicantly decreasing in rm size (Demsetz and Lehn (1985), Jensen and Murphy (1990),
Gibbons and Murphy (1992), Schaefer (1998), Hall and Liebman (1998) and Baker and Hall
(2004)). As stated above, linear models predict that dollar-dollar incentives should be constant
across CEOs and thus independent of size. One interpretation of this inconsistency between
optimal contracting theory and observed practice is that incentives are ine¢ ciently low in large
rms, perhaps because governance is particularly weak in such companies (e.g. Bebchuk and
Fried (2004)). If this argument is correct, the implications are profound. If the CEOs in charge
of the largest companies have the weakest incentives to exert e¤ort, then billions of dollars of
value may be lost each year. This explanation would also imply a pressing need for intervention:
the current system of incentive determination is broken, and must be xed.
Our model has the opposite conclusion. With a multiplicative production function, the
dollar increase in rm value from CEO e¤ort is proportional to size, i.e. has a elasticity of
1 with rm size. With multiplicative preferences, the CEOs dollar utility gain from shirking
rises with the wage, but wages only have a 1=3 elasticity with size (see Gabaix and Landier
(2008) for a survey of the empirical evidence). Therefore, dollar-dollar incentives should have
a size elasticity of 1=3  1 =  2=3, which is very close to our empirical estimate of -0.60 (with
1The optimal contract can also be implemented with other equity-like instruments, such as options and
bonuses. Our contract gives the optimal amount of share-equivalents, where other instruments are converted
to shares according to their deltas. See Section C for an extension of the model to general incentive contracts
and Section D for detail on the empirical conversion of options.
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a standard error of 0.05).
The observed negative relationship is therefore quantitatively consistent with optimal con-
tracting. Simply put, since e¤ort has such a high dollar e¤ect in large rms, the manager will
work even if he has a relatively small equity stake. Note that unlike other determinants of
incentives studied by the literature, size can be measured with little error. This limits our ex-
ibility in calibration, allowing the model to be subject to particularly close empirical scrutiny,
and its predictions to be rejectable.
While our choice of a multiplicative functional form was motivated by its intuitive plau-
sibility and use in macroeconomics, rather than the desire to match moments, we then show
that it is not only su¢ cient to match the empirical scaling, but also necessary. This result
has implications for future quantitative models of CEO compensation: the desire for empirical
consistency limits the functional form that can be used.
Understanding the scaling of incentive measures with rm size is also important to evaluate
the various metrics available to empiricists. Our multiplicative model advocates a new empirical
measure of CEO incentives: it suggests that percent-percent incentives are independent of
rm size, a fact conrmed by the data. Translated into real variables, and allowing for CEO
incentives to stem from existing holdings of equity as well as new ows, this measure is the
scaled wealth-performance sensitivity: the dollar change in wealth for a percentage change in
rm value, divided by annual pay. By contrast, existing commonly used measures vary strongly
with rm size. Size invariance is a desirable property for an empirical measure, as it leads to
comparability across rms and over time.
A second empirical prediction is the level of incentives. Jensen and Murphy (1990) nd
that CEO wealth falls by only $3.25 for every $1,000 loss in shareholder value. As this gure
appears low, it is frequently interpreted as evidence that current practices are inadequate to
induce shareholder value maximization. Hall and Liebman (1998) disagree, arguing that dollar-
dollarincentives are not the relevant measure of incentive compatibility. Indeed, we nd that
observed incentives are su¢ cient to deter suboptimal actions (shirking, pursuit of pet projects,
or empire-building acquisitions) if such behavior increases the CEOs utility by a monetary
equivalent no greater than 0.9 times his annual wage. Since it appears plausible that the
private benets from many value-destructive actions with multiplicative impacts fall below this
upper bound, incentives are able to solve many multiplicative agency problems. Again, our
specication is central for this result: the cost of e¤ort is proportional to CEO wealth and its
benet is proportional to rm value. Since the latter is substantially greater, the dollar gains
from e¤ort are very high and so even a small equity stake (i.e. small dollar-dollar incentives)
will induce maximum e¤ort. Haubrich (1994) identies the parameter values in the linear model
that would be consistent with Jensen and Murphys statistic. He notes that the large number
of free variables (including risk aversion) makes it relatively easy to match one moment. Our
model, which lacks a risk aversion parameter, can explain both the level of incentives and their
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scaling with rm size.
A third stylized fact is the positive correlation between rm volatility and wealth volatil-
ity. Traditional models predict a negative relationship: higher rm volatility increases the
risk-bearing costs imposed on the manager by incentive compensation. The optimal level of
incentives, and thus e¤ort, is lower. In this paper, as noted previously, it is always optimal
to implement the maximum e¤ort level, regardless of costs to the manager and thus volatility.
Optimal incentives are independent of volatility; since wealth volatility equals the product of
incentives and rm risk, the model generates the positive relationship found in the data.
We extend the model by noting that the multiplicative production function does not apply to
all CEO decisions. Certain actions such as perk consumption (e.g. the purchase of a corporate
jet) reduce rm value by a xed dollar amount independent of size, and thus have an additive
e¤ect. Since such actions have a very small e¤ect on the equity returns of a large company,
we show that no amount of equity compensation can deter perks. While the seminal model of
Jensen andMeckling (1976) implies that all agency issues can and should be solved by incentives,
we show that equity can only address large agency problems with a multiplicative e¤ect on rm
value. Smaller, additiveissues such as perk consumption should instead be addressed through
direct monitoring, and thus have no explanatory power for incentive compensation.
This paper is closely related to a number of recent structural models and calibrations of the
CEO incentive problem. Dittmann and Maug (2007), Dittmann, Maug and Spalt (2008) and
Armstrong, Larcker and Su (2007) explore the optimal structure of compensation, in particular
the mix of stock and options. Garicano and Hubbard (2007) also calibrate a high-talent labor
market, the market for lawyers. Gayle and Miller (2007) explore the contribution of moral
hazard to the rise in CEO pay. The linear model closest to explaining the observed scaling
between incentives and rm size is Baker and Hall (2004). Theirs is an inversionmodel,
which assumes observed incentives are e¢ cient and backs outthe production function that
would be consistent. By contrast, our paper motivates specications from rst principles, and
then compares the resulting predictions with the data to evaluate the e¢ ciency of current
practices. In addition, it considers the e¤ect of preferences as well as production functions on
incentives. Like Baker and Hall, Coles, Lemmon and Meschke (2007) also use incentives as an
input. They estimate the productivity of both managerial e¤ort and physical capital, and in
turn use these parameters to generate the stylized U-shaped relationship between Tobins q and
managerial ownership.
Our paper di¤ers from the above theories owing to its contrasting objectives (principally,
the level and scaling of incentives2) and its modeling approach (multiplicative specications and
a general equilibrium approach incorporating both pay and incentives.) Baranchuk, Macdonald
2Dicks (2007) predicts a negative relationship between incentive pay and rm size through a di¤erent channel:
governance is stronger in large rms, reducing the need for monetary incentives. He (2007) also nds a negative
relationship with geometric Brownian cash ows and CARA utility. In our paper, the CEO is risk neutral.
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and Yang (2007) and Falato and Kadyrzhanova (2007) also present general equilibrium models
of incentives, although without multiplicative functional forms and with di¤erent purposes. The
former endogenizes rm size and focuses on the e¤ect of product market conditions on CEO
compensation. The latter analyzes the e¤ect of industry competition and a rms competitive
position on optimal contracts.
A separate literature to which this paper relates examines the optimality of CEO compen-
sation practices. Our paper focuses on the level and scaling of incentives, but there are a large
number of other stylized facts of the CEO labor market not considered by our model and which
may indeed result from rent extraction (Bebchuk and Fried (2004)). Examples include the wide-
spread use of hiddencompensation, the lack of relative performance evaluation, the high pay
of U.S. CEOs compared to the rest of the world, the widespread use of at-the-money options,
and positive market reactions to deaths of a potentially optimally contracted CEO. Our models
tractability and empirical consistency may render it a benchmark upon which future theories
can build, to explore some of the issues on which the current paper is silent while continuing to
match the level and scaling of incentives. In Edmans and Gabaix (2008) we extend the current
framework to incorporate risk aversion and general contracting instruments under continuous
time, showing that the key results remain robust and generating additional predictions. A
number of other theories investigate whether or not the above features can be consistent with
e¢ ciency, using di¤erent frameworks as they do not simultaneously attempt to match empirical
incentives. Examples include the level of total pay (Gabaix and Landier (2008)), severance pay
(Almazan and Suarez (2003), Manso (2006), Inderst and Mueller (2006)), pensions (Edmans
(2007)), perks (Rajan and Wulf (2006)), and the lack of indexation (Oyer (2004)). Kuhnen
and Zwiebel (2007) model hidden compensation as ine¢ cient rent extraction and show that a
suboptimal contracting model can explain many features of the data.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 1 we present our general equilibrium model
with multiplicative functional forms, and derive empirical implications. Section 2 shows that
these predictions quantitatively match the data. Section 3 considers further implications of the
model, in particular the ine¤ectiveness of incentives at deterring perks, and Section 4 concludes.
1 The Basic Model
We start in Section 1.1 by deriving the optimal division of CEO compensation into stock and
cash salary, in a partial equilibrium analysis that takes total compensation as given. In Section
1.2 we embed this analysis into a general equilibrium which endogenizes total pay. This leads
to empirical predictions for the scaling of pay-performance sensitivity with rm size, detailed
in Section 1.3. Section 1.4 illustrates that these results naturally extend to measures of wealth-
performance sensitivity, where CEO incentives are principally provided by existing security
holdings, rather than ow compensation. Section 1.5 proves that multiplicative preferences are
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not only su¢ cient, but also necessary to generate our scaling predictions.
Since our objective is to provide testable predictions, we maximize tractability by building
a deliberately parsimonious model where the manager is risk-neutral, the e¤ort decision is
binary and the contract is restricted to comprise cash and shares. We show that our results are
robust to multiple e¤ort levels and general incentive contracts in Section 3.2 and Appendix C
respectively. Owing to risk neutrality, there is a continuum of incentive-compatible contracts;
we select the one that minimizes the variable component of compensation as this would be
strictly optimal under any level of risk aversion. In Edmans and Gabaix (2008), we show that
the models key results hold under a general risk-averse utility function and in continuous time.
1.1 Incentive Pay in Partial Equilibrium
The CEOs objective function is:
U = E [cg (e)] ; (1)
where c is the CEOs monetary compensation and e 2 fe; eg denotes CEO e¤ort. We normalize
e = 0 < e < 1, and g (e) = 1 < g (0) = 1= (1  e), where 0 < e < 1.
This paper denes e¤ort broadly, to apply to any action that increases rm value but
involves a non-pecuniary cost to the manager. In the literal interpretation, e = e represents
high e¤ort and e = e is shirking. A second interpretation is the choice of an investment project,
strategy or acquisition target, where e = e is the rst best project and e = e yields the CEO
private benets, such as an empire-building expansion. We use the term shirkingand private
benets interchangeably. Shirking increases the CEOs utility by (approximately) a fraction
e, where  denotes the unit cost of e¤ort.
The critical feature of this model is the multiplicative functional form in equation (1).
Shirking has a percentage e¤ect on the CEOs overall utility, and thus the dollar amount the
CEO would pay to consume private benets is increasing in his wage. Private benets are
therefore a normal good in our model, which is consistent with the treatment of most goods
and services in consumer theory. Under this assumption, the share of total pay allocated
to consumption and leisure is independent of the wage changes in salary do not a¤ect the
composition of the bundleof consumption and leisure purchased by the CEO, only the overall
size of the bundle. As the CEO becomes richer, he purchases greater amounts of all goods
and services, including private benets. This assumption is also plausible under the literal
interpretation of shirking as leisure time. Leisure allows the CEO to enjoy goods and services
that he can purchase with his salary, and so shirking and consumption are complementary
goods.
In addition to being intuitively appealing, multiplicative preferences also have empirically
consistent implications for the scaling of labor supply with the wage. With an additive spec-
ication, leisure falls to zero as salary rises; here, labor supply is una¤ected by wage changes
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over time.3 This empirical consistency explains the common use of multiplicative preferences
in macroeconomics, a eld in which models are frequently calibrated to the data. Indeed, they
are a necessary feature of macroeconomic models that feature rising wages but constant labor
supply. For example, Cooley and Prescott (1995) write: For the postwar period, [per capita
leisure] has been approximately constant. We also know that real wages ... have increased
steadily in the postwar period. Taken together, those two observations imply that the elasticity
of substitution between consumption and leisure should be near unity.
We now turn from preferences to the e¤ort production function. The baseline rm value is
S and the end-of-period stock price P1 is given by4
P1 = S (1 + ) (1 + e  e) ; (2)
where  is stochastic noise with mean zero. E¤ort has a multiplicative e¤ect on rm value: low
e¤ort (e = 0) reduces rm value by a fraction e. This is plausible for the majority of CEO
actions which can be rolled outacross the whole company, and thus have a greater e¤ect in
a larger rm. Examples include the choice of strategy, the launch of new projects, or designing
a process innovation to increase production e¢ ciency. However, certain actions have a xed
dollar e¤ect independent of rm size, such as perk consumption or stealing. We consider such
additive actions in Section 3.1.
We observe that, on the equilibrium path implementing high e¤ort, the initial stock price is
P0 = E [P1], i.e. P0 = S. We assume that S > w, where S is the rms market capitalization:
the rm value gains from high e¤ort exceed the managers disutility, and so it is optimal to
elicit e¤ort.5 For simplicity, we assume an all-equity rm. If the rm is levered, S represents
the aggregate value of the assets of the rm (debt plus equity) and P denotes the aggregate
value per share.
The CEOs compensation c is composed of a xed cash salary f  0, and   0 shares:
c = f + P1: (3)
The CEO is subject to limited liability (c  0) and has a reservation utility of w, the wage
available in alternative employment. This is endogenized in Section 1.2.
The optimal contract elicits high e¤ort (e = e) and pays the CEO his reservation wage,
3For example, consider the labor supply l of a worker living for one period, with a wage w, consumption
c = wl, and utility v (c; l). He solves maxl v (wl; l). If utility is v (c; l) =  (cg (l)), then the problem is
maxl  (wl g (l)), and the optimal labor supply l is independent of w.
4Here we normalize the normal growth of earnings to 0. We could normalize to another value g, by formulating
the end-of-period-price as P1 = S (1 + ) (1 + e  e) (1 + g). The rest of the analysis would be unchanged.
5The proof is as follows. If the manager works, he is paid w and rm value (net of wages) is S   w, leading
to total surplus of S. If the manager shirks, he is paid w(1   e), to keep his utility at w. Firm value, net of
wage, is V = S(1  e)  w(1  e) and total surplus is V + w = S(1  e) + we. Hence total surplus is higher
if the manager works if and only S  S(1  e) + we, i.e., S  w.
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i.e. E [c] = w, while minimizing the number of shares given to the manager. It is stated in
Proposition 1 below.
Proposition 1 (CEO incentive pay in partial equilibrium). Fix the managers expected pay at
w and assume  < 1 (the cost of e¤ort is not too strong). The optimal contract pays a fraction
 of the wage in shares, and the rest in cash. Specically, it comprises a xed base salary, f ,
and P0 worth of shares, with:
P0 = w; (4)
f  = w (1  ) ; (5)
where  is the unit cost of e¤ort. The managers realized compensation is:
c = w (1 +  (r   E [r])) ; (6)
where r = P1=P0   1 is the rms stock market return.
In the optimal contract, % of the CEOs wage w is paid in shares, and the remainder
(1 )% in cash. The intuition follows from our multiplicative specication. The utility gained
from shirking is increasing in the CEOs dollar wage. The cost of shirking has a percentage
e¤ect on rm value, and thus is increasing in the dollar value of the CEOs shares. Hence, to
maintain equality between costs and benets, any increase in the CEOs wage must be matched
by an exactly proportional increase in his shares in other words, the CEOs dollar equity must
comprise a constant fraction of the total wage.
Put di¤erently, if e¤ort has multiplicative costs and benets, the percentage change in pay
for a percentage change in rm value (i.e. %-% incentives) is the relevant measure, and must
be at least  to achieve incentive capacity. In terms of real variables, this %-% measure equals
the proportion of total salary that is comprised of shares. The optimal contract minimizes the
number of shares, and so this proportion equals .
Note that any contract where at least % of the wage is in shares will achieve incentive
compatibility, and there are a continuum of contracts that satisfy this criterion. The models
strongest prediction is thus in the form of an inequality restriction; the optimal ratio is not
steadfastly determined. We choose the contract that minimizes the number of shares as this
would be strictly optimal under any non-zero level of risk aversion. However, if risk consid-
erations are insignicant in reality, the ratio may exceed  in some cases, and the models
empirical implications will be contradicted. We show in Section 2 that its main predictions are
quantitatively consistent with the data.
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1.2 Incentive Pay in Market Equilibrium
The above principal-agent model only solves for the optimal division of a xed wage w into
cash and shares. We now embed the previous analysis into a market equilibrium where the
equilibrium wage w is endogenously determined. We directly import the model of Gabaix and
Landier (2008) (GL), the essentials of which we review in Appendix A. There is a continuum
of rms of di¤erent size and managers with di¤erent talent. Since talented CEOs are more
valuable in larger rms, the nth most talented manager is matched with the nth largest rm
in competitive equilibrium, and earns the following competitive equilibrium pay:
w (n) = D (n)S(n)=S (n)
 = ; (7)
where S (n) is the size of rm n, n is the index of a reference rm (e.g. the 250-th largest
rm), S (n) is the size of that reference rm, D (n) is a constant independent of rm size,
and ;  and  are also constants. In particular, CEOs at large rms earn more as they are
the most talented, with a pay-rm size elasticity of  =    =. For their calibration, GL use
 =  = 1,  = 2=3.
In our model, rm values P0 and P1 are endogenous to CEO e¤ort, but baseline rm size S is
exogenous. The incentive problem is unchanged even if S is endogenous (e.g. to CEO talent).
It remains the case that rm value falls by e% if the manager shirks, and so Proposition 1
continues to hold. In addition, GL give several reasons why exogenous rm size is a reasonable
benchmark for the talent assignment model (see, e.g., their footnote 11 and Online Appendix).
In particular, the calibrations of CEO talent by GL and Tervio (2007) evaluate the impact of
CEO talent on size to be very small. Therefore, size is primarily determined by factors other
than CEO talent (such as productivity di¤erentials as in Luttmer (2007)). Tervio (2007, Section
3.1) shows that the scaling of CEO talent impact is robust to some forms of endogenous rm
size. Endogenizing rm size is the focus of Baranchuk, MacDonald and Yang (2007).
GL only specify the total compensation that the CEO must be paid in market equilibrium.
We now incorporate the incentive results of Section 1.1 to determine the form of compensation.
The equilibrium incentive pay is analogous to Proposition 1 and stated below:
Proposition 2 (CEO incentive pay in market equilibrium). Assume  < 1 (the cost of e¤ort
is not too strong). Let n denote the index of a reference rm. In equilibrium, the manager of
index n runs a rm of size S (n), and is paid an expected wage:
w (n) = D (n)S(n)=S (n)
 = ; (8)
where S(n) is the size of the reference rm and D (n) =  CnT 0 (n) = (   ) is a constant
independent of rm size. The optimal contract pays manager n a xed base salary, f n, and
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nPn worth of shares, with:
nPn = w (n) ;
f n = w (n) (1  ) ;
where  is the managers disutility of e¤ort. The managers realized compensation is:
c (n) = w (n) (1 +  (r (n)  E [r (n)])) ;
where r (n) = P1n=P0n   1 is the rms stock market return.
In Proposition 2, there is a full separation between the determination of expected pay (which
is the same as in GL), and the determination of the incentive mix (which is the same as in
Proposition 1). The reason is that the equilibrium entails a rst-best level of e¤ort, and all
CEOs exert the same high e¤ort. Firms therefore compete on pay, not on required e¤ort, and
so total pay is as in GL. Given this total pay, Proposition 1 an optimal way a rm incentivizes
the CEO to achieve the high e¤ort.
We assume that  is constant across rms to maintain the simplicity of our model and limit
our degrees of freedom in calibration. The above Proposition remains valid if  di¤ers across
rms:  is simply replaced by n. We need not make any assumptions on how n varies with
n: as long as n < 1 for each rm, e¤ort can be induced by the incentive contract. Since there
is no shirking, all rms are at their baselinevalue of S as in GL, and so CEO assignment is
unchanged.
Note that the total level of pay w(n) is determined entirely by the CEOs marginal product,
and is independent of incentive considerations. The latter only a¤ects the division of total pay
into cash and stock components. Hence high pay is not justiedby the need to reward CEOs
for their e¤ort. High levels of pay are entirely justied by scarcity in the market for talent, not
by incentive considerations. Simply put, total compensation is driven by pay-for-talent, not
pay-for-e¤ort.
1.3 Pay-Performance Sensitivities in Market Equilibrium
The empirical literature uses a variety of measures for pay-performance sensitivity. These are
dened below (we suppress the dependence on rm n for brevity).
Denition 1 Let c denote realized compensation, w the expected compensation, S the market
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value of the rm, and r the rms return. We dene the following pay-performance sensitivities:
bI =
@c
@r
1
w
=
 lnPay
 lnFirm Value
(9)
bII =
@c
@r
1
S
=
$Pay
$Firm Value
(10)
bIII =
@c
@r
=
$Pay
 lnFirm Value
: (11)
bI denotes %-% incentives and is used (or advocated) by Murphy (1985), Gibbons and
Murphy (1992) and Rosen (1992). bII represents $-$ incentives and is used by Demsetz and
Lehn (1985), Yermack (1995) and Schaefer (1998). bIII measures $-% incentives, the dollar
change in pay for a given percentage change in rm value, and is advocated by Holmstrom
(1992). The next Proposition derives predictions for these quantities.
Proposition 3 (Pay-performance sensitivities). Equilibrium pay-performance sensitivities are
given by:
bI =  (12)
bII = 
w
S
(13)
bIII = w; (14)
where w is given by (7).
Share-based compensation can be implemented in a number of forms, such as stock, options
and bonuses. If the incentive component is implemented purely using shares, these sensitivities
have natural interpretations. bI represents the dollar value of the CEOs shares as a proportion
of the CEOs total pay, bII is the percentage of shares outstanding held by the CEO, and
bIII denotes the dollar value of the CEOs shares. If the incentive component is implemented
using other methods, the above coe¢ cients constitute the e¤ective share ownership, where
instruments are converted into share equivalents according to their delta (see Section D for the
conversion of options.)
Proposition 4 (Scaling of pay-performance sensitivities with rm size). Let  denote the
cross-sectional elasticity of expected pay to rm size: w / S. In GL,  =    =. The
pay-performance sensitivities scale as follows in the cross-section:
1. bI is independent of rm size:
bI / S0:
2. bII scales as S 1:
bII / S 1:
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3. bIII scales as S:
bIII / S:
In particular, in the calibration  = 1=3 used in GL,
bI / S0, bII / S 2=3, and bIII / S1=3: (15)
Proposition 5 (Dependence of pay-performance sensitivities on the size of the reference rm).
Let n denote the index of a reference rm and S(n) its size. The pay-performance sensitivities
scale with S(n) as follows:
bI / S0S (n)0
bII / S (1 )S (n) 
bIII / SS (n)  :
where  is the elasticity of CEO impact in GL (see equation (29) in Appendix A
In particular, in the calibration  = 1=3;  = 1 used in GL,
bI / S0S (n)0 , bII / S 2=3S (n)2=3 , and bIII / S1=3S (n)2=3 :
Table 1 summarizes our predictions for the di¤erent measures of pay-performance sensitivity.
Insert Table 1 about here
Propositions 4 and 5 imply that the %-% measure of pay-performance sensitivity is inde-
pendent of both rm size and the size of reference rms. From Proposition 1, %-% incentives
equal  in the optimal contract. Since  is constant across rms, %-% incentives should also
be constant if compensation is e¢ cient in all rms.
In an additive model, e¤ort has a xed dollar e¤ect on rm value and the managers utility.
Thus, $-$ incentives (bII) are the relevant measure and should be constant across rms, if
all companies are contracting optimally. However, Demsetz and Lehn (1985), Jensen and
Murphy (1990), Gibbons and Murphy (1992), Schaefer (1998), Hall and Liebman (1998) and
Baker and Hall (2004) all nd that $-$ incentives decline strongly with rm size. One common
interpretation of this result is that incentives are suboptimally low in large rms, either because
of greater managerial entrenchment in such companies (Bebchuk and Fried (2004)), or because
large rms are highly visible and face strong political constraints on high pay (Jensen and
Murphy (1990)).
However, Proposition 4 has a di¤erent conclusion: bII should optimally decline with rm
size. E¤ort is multiplicative in rm value and thus substantially increases the dollar value of a
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large rm. Therefore, a smaller percentage equity holding is required to induce e¤ort: applied
to a large dollar value change, this creates a su¢ cient incentive to work. It is e¢ cient for
CEOs of large rms to have low $-$ incentives. This point has been previously noted by Hall
and Liebman (1998) and modeled by Baker and Hall (2004) in a di¤erent framework, to back
out the production function that would be consistent with observed incentives. We postulate
multiplicative specications based on rst principles and derive quantitative predictions for this
scaling in market equilibrium. Since bII = bI w
S
and the wage w scales with S1=3 , bII should
scale with S 2=3.
Finally, Section 1.1 shows that bIII should be proportional to total pay. However, since total
pay is less than proportional to rm size (it scales with S1=3), dollar equity holdings should also
be less than proportional to rm size.
1.4 Wealth-Performance Sensitivities in Market Equilibrium
Thus far, we have assumed the CEOs incentives stem purely from his ow compensation.
However, for many CEOs, the vast majority of incentives stem from changes in the value of
existing holdings of stock and options (see Hall and Liebman (1998), Core, Guay and Verrecchia
(2003) among others). Appendix B presents a full model that extends the previous results to
a multiperiod setting. Since e¤ort continues to have a multiplicative impact on rm value and
utility, it remains the case that %-% incentives should be independent of rm size.
Replacing ow compensation in the numerator of Denition 1 with the overall change in
wealth yields the following denitions of wealth-performance sensitivity:
Denition 2 Let W denote total CEO wealth, w the expected ow pay, S the market value of
the rm, and r the rms return. We suppress the dependence on rm n for brevity and dene
the following wealth-performance sensitivities:
BI =
@W
@r
1
w
=
$Wealth
 lnFirm Value
1
$Wage
(16)
BII =
@W
@r
1
S
=
$Wealth
$Firm Value
(17)
BIII =
@W
@r
=
$Wealth
 lnFirm Value
: (18)
BII is used by Jensen and Murphy (1990); Hall and Liebman (1998) report both BII and
BIII .6 Multiplying the pay-performance sensitivities in Proposition 5 by W
w
gives the following
magnitudes for wealth-performance sensitivities:
6We scale BI by the wage, not by wealth which may seem more intuitive. The reason is data limitations: in
the U.S., the only wealth data we have is on the CEOs security holdings in his own rm. Therefore, measured
wealth will mechanically have a (close to) constant rm value elasticity for example, if he holds stock and no
options, @Wt@rt
1
Wt
would equal 1.
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Proposition 6 (Wealth-performance sensitivities). Let W denote total CEO wealth and w the
expected ow pay. Then:
BI = 
W
w
(19)
BII = 
W
S
(20)
BIII = W: (21)
The scalings with rm size S and the size of the reference rm S are as in Propositions 4 and
5.
Proposition 6 predicts that all three measures of wealth-performance sensitivity are higher
for wealthier CEOs. This has been empirically conrmed by Becker (2006) for BII and BIII
(he does not investigate BI). Beckers explanation is that risk aversion declines with wealth,
therefore rendering incentive pay less costly. Our model o¤ers a di¤erent explanation that does
not rely on risk aversion, but stems from the assumption that shirking is a normal good.
The numerical scalings for pay-performance sensitivity in equation (15) were obtained using
the well-documented 1/3 elasticity of the wage with size. Using the data described later in
Section 2, we conrm that this elasticity holds for the relationship between wealth and size:
we nd a coe¢ cient of 0.37 with a standard error of 0.05. By contrast, W=w has an elasticity
of 0.02 (standard error of 0.07). Note that we only have data on the CEOs nancial wealth
in his own rm (plus accumulated annual ow compensation), and so our results assume the
proportion of own-rm nancial wealth to total wealth is constant across rm size.
1.5 The Requirement for Multiplicative Preferences
Our choice of the multiplicative specication (1) was motivated by rst principles, in particular
the view that private benets are most plausibly a normal good. Such a functional form led
to the prediction that BI is independent of w, which we validate empirically in Section 2.1.
We now demonstrate that additive preferences would achieve di¤erent predictions; indeed, we
prove that multiplicative preferences are necessary (as well as merely su¢ cient) to yield this
implication. For clarity, we use a one-period model and focus on the analogous measure bI .
Many previous theories of CEO pay (Haubrich (1994), Schaefer (1998), Baker and Hall
(2004)) are based on the classical additivemodels of Grossman and Hart (1983) and Holm-
strom and Milgrom (1987), which in its risk-neutral version uses the form E [c]  h (e), with h
non-decreasing. We maintain the same contract structure (equation (3)): bI is the fraction of
w invested in stock, so that c = w
 
1 + bIr

. With the utility function E [c] h (e), the optimal
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bI is given by bI = h(e) h(0)
we
, which implies:7
bI / w 1: (22)
The additive form therefore predicts that bI decreases with the wage, whereas the multiplicative
model predicts that bI is constant.
Another popular utility function is E

c =
   h (e), with   2 (0; 1]. This leads to bI /
w   for large w, and thus also predicts that bI declines with rm size. For su¢ ciently high
consumption, e¤ort has a very small negative e¤ect on the agents utility and so fewer %-%
incentives are required to ensure compatibility.
While the above considered two specic functional forms, we now demonstrate a general
result: that multiplicative preferences are necessary to generate a size-independent bI . We
consider a general utility function E[u (c; e)], with e 2 f0; eg. The rms return is r = e  e, so
that the return is 0 on the equilibrium path where the CEO exerts high e¤ort. The rm selects
expected pay w and incentives bI so that c = w
 
1 + bIr

. The optimal contract minimizes w and
bI while granting the CEO his reservation utility of u and eliciting e = e.8 The next Proposition
states that multiplicative preferences are required for the optimal bI to be independent of u
(and thus w).
Proposition 7 (Necessity and su¢ ciency of multiplicative preferences to generate a size-independent
bI). Assume the CEOs utility function is u (c; e), and the rms return is r = e  e. Suppose
the optimal a¢ ne contract involves a scaled pay-performance sensitivity bI = E [@c=@r] =E [c]
that is independent of E [c]. Then, the utility function is multiplicative in consumption and
e¤ort, i.e. can be written:
u (c; e) =  (cg (e)) (23)
for some functions  and g.
Conversely, if preferences are of the type (23), then the optimal contract has a slope bI that
is independent of E [c].
This result may be relevant for future calibratable models of corporate nance. While the
level of incentives (a single number) can potentially be explained by a number of di¤erent
models, the requirement to quantitatively explain scalings across rms of di¤erent sizes implies
a tight constraint on the specications that can be assumed.
To keep the analysis streamlined, we proved the above Proposition in a restrictive context
with no noise, although we allowed for a general utility function. We suspect that the results
7The proof is as follows. The optimal bI is the smallest bI such that E [c  h (e) j e = e]  E [c  h (0) j e = 0],
and so satises E [c  h (e) j e = e] = E [c  h (0) j e = 0]. Since c = w  1 + bIr, E [c j e] = w  1 + bI (e  e).
Therefore, w   h (e) = w  1  bIe  h (0), i.e. bI = h(e) h(0)we .
8More fully, u = E [u (c; e) j e = e]  E [u (c; e) j e = 0].
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extend to more general settings, but such an investigation is beyond the central objective of
this paper.9
2 Empirical Evaluation
This section calculates empirical measures of wealth-performance sensitivity and assesses the
extent to which current practices are consistent with our neoclassical benchmark. Section 2.1
shows that the data quantitatively matches the models predictions for the scalings of incentives
with rm size. Section 2.2 demonstrates that the level of incentives is also consistent with our
optimal contracting model.
2.1 Determinants of CEO Incentives
As noted in Section 1.3, the stylized fact is that $-$ incentives decline with rm size. Our market
equilibrium model derives a quantitative prediction for this scaling. Specically,  = = 1=3
(as found by GL) implies an elasticity of  2=3. Consistent with our model, Schaefer nds $-$
incentives scale as S , with  ' 0:68.10 Existing research is also consistent with the models
prediction that %-% incentives are independent of size (Gibbons and Murphy (1992)). We do
not know of any studies that investigate the link between $% incentives and size.
However, prior ndings cannot be interpreted as conclusive support of the model. The
vast majority of CEO incentives come from his existing stock of shares and options, rather
than compensation ows (salary, bonus and new grants of stock and options). Owing to
data limitations, Gibbons and Murphy (1992) consider only ow compensation, and Schaefer
(1998) includes existing stock, but not options. We therefore conduct our own empirical tests
of the model, using measures of wealth-performance sensitivity. We merge Compustat with
ExecuComp (1992-2006) and select the largest 500 rms in aggregate value (debt plus equity)
9For instance, with noise, we suspect that to keep b constant across expected utilities, the function  must
actually be:  (c) = A ln c +B or Ac1  = (1   ) +B.
10This  is taken from Table 4 of Schaefer (1998), and is equal to 1 2 (  ) using his notation. We average
over his four estimates of . Note that Schaefer estimates a non-linear model that is closely related to ours, but
not identical, so his ndings only constitute weak support.
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in each year.11 We calculate the wealth-performance sensitivities as follows12:
BI =
1
wt

Value of stock + Number of options @V
@P
 P

(24)
BII =
1
St

Value of stock + Number of options @V
@P
 P

(25)
BIII =

Value of stock + Number of options @V
@P
 P

(26)
We use the Core and Guay (2002) methodology to estimate the option deltas. (Appendix
D describes our calculations in further detail.) All variables are converted into constant dollars
using the GDP deator from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. Controlling for year and Fama-
French (1997) industry xed e¤ects, and clustering standard errors at the rm level, we estimate
the following elasticities:13
ln(BIi;t) = +   ln(Si;t)
ln(BIIi;t ) = +   ln(Si;t)
ln(BIIIi;t ) = +   ln(Si;t):
where S is the rms aggregate value of debt plus equity. Table 2 illustrates the results, which
are consistent with the predictions of equation (15).14 Specically, BI is independent of rm
size: the coe¢ cient of 0.04 is less than its standard deviation. BII (BIII) have size elasticities
of  0:60 (0.40), statistically indistinguishable from the models prediction of  2=3 (1/3). Our
model can therefore quantitatively explain the size elasticities of all three measures of wealth-
performance sensitivity.
Insert Table 2 about here
The empirical literature has used a wide variety of measures of CEO incentives, but there
has been limited theoretical guidance over which measure is appropriate. A notable excep-
tion is Baker and Hall (2004), who show that the relevant measure depends on the scaling of
11Our results are very similar if we use sales as a measure of rm size, and if we select the top 1000 or 200
rms.
12BIII = @W@r =
@W
@S P , where
@W
@S is the deltaof the CEOs portfolio. The delta of each share is 1, and so
the delta of his stock holdings equals the number of his shares. The delta of each option is @V@P and so the delta
of his option holdings equals @V@P multiplied by the number of options. Multiplying both components by P gives
@W
@r , i.e. B
III . BI and BII are transformations of BIII as given by equations (19) and (20).
13We use the standard panel-data method which assumes the coe¢ cients  are constant across rms. An
alternative approach would be to allow  to vary between rms according to observed characteristics, as in
Hermalin and Wallace (2001). They estimate the pay-performance relationship and that inter-rm di¤erences
will lead to this sensitivity di¤ering between rms. Our focus here is instead the WPS-size relationship, and it
is not clear that this will vary between rms. We therefore use the standard approach.
14Although we have 15 years of data and 500 rms, there are fewer than 7,500 observations in each regression,
mainly because a number of rms do not have SIC codes and thus cannot be classied into an industry.
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CEO productivity with rm size. If productivity is constant in dollar terms regardless of rm
size, BII is appropriate as it is size-invariant; if it is linear in rm size, BIII is the correct
measure as it becomes size-invariant. However, their calibrations estimate the size-elasticity of
CEO productivity of 0.4, in between the two extremes, suggesting that both measures may be
problematic.
We show that the optimal incentives measure depends on the specication for preferences as
well as the production function. In our model, utility is multiplicative in e¤ort and we predict
that BI is independent of rm size. Table 2 empirically conrms the size invariance of BI ,
thus supporting our modeling assumptions, as well as the size dependence of BII and BIII .
We thus advocate BI as the preferred empirical measure of incentives. If incentives are the
dependent variable, size independence allows comparability of the strength of incentives across
rms or over time. If wealth-performance sensitivity are the independent variable of interest,
size invariance ensures that its explanatory power does not simply arise because it proxies for
size. If size (or a variable correlated with size) is the covariate of interest and incentives are
merely a control, the use of BI ensures that the coe¢ cient on size is not distorted by the
inclusion of another size proxy in the regression.
To our knowledge, BI has not been used in previous studies. Murphy (1985) and Gibbons
and Murphy (1992) calculate the elasticity of ow pay to rm value, i.e. bI . Hall and Lieb-
man (1998) calculate a variant of BI where the denominator is ow compensation w plus the
median return applied to the CEOs existing portfolio of shares and options. In addition to
introducing BI empirically, we justify it theoretically by comparing its properties to alternative
measures. Our theoretical framework also underpins our denition of BI , in particular why
ow compensation only should be in the denominator.
In a contemporaneous paper, Edmans, Goldstein and Jiang (2008) use stochastic frontier
analysis to construct a measure of each rms maximum potential valuation under full e¢ ciency.
They nd that a rms discount to its potential value is strongly decreasing in BI . By contrast,
Habib and Ljungqvists (2005) stochastic frontier analysis nds no relationship with BII . This
supports the view that BI is a well-behaved measure of incentives.
2.2 The Level of CEO Incentives
Having investigated our models scaling predictions, we now assess whether empirical levels
of wealth-performance sensitivity are consistent with e¢ ciency. Our primary measure is %-%
incentives; the other measures are mechanical transformations. The model predicts BI = W
w
(equation (19)). We present gures for 1999, the median year in our sample by level of incentives.
The median BI in 1999 is 9.05.15
15Hall and Liebman (1998, Table VIII) estimate BI = 3:9 for 1994, the nal year in their sample. Their
denominator includes not only ow compensation but also the expected appreciation of the CEOs stock and
options.
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We therefore calibrate  = BIw=W = 9w=W . Shirking increases the CEOs utility by a
fraction e = 9 w
W
e of his wealth, i.e. $9we in dollar terms. e is the percentage amount by
which CEO can reduce rm value by shirking or empire-building (through organic expansion or
an acquisition). A natural starting point is the average takeover premium of 30%.16 However,
the takeover premium can be motivated by factors other than managerial misbehavior, such
as synergies or undervaluation. Since a high input for e would make it easier to match the BI
found in the data, we conservatively set e ' 10% which yields eW = $0:9w. The current level
of incentives is able to deter multiplicative actions for which the private benets of shirking
increase the CEOs utility by an amount no greater than 0.9 times his annual salary.
This appears a high upper bound which incorporates the majority of potential value-
destructive actions, and so it seems that observed incentives are able to address a number
of agency issues with multiplicative e¤ects on rm value. This result echoes Taylor (2007), who
builds and estimates a structural model and nds that the observed level of CEO turnover is not
too low to be consistent with optimal ring decisions. However, incentives are not e¤ective in
two cases: if the utility from shirking is very high (Proposition 1 requires  < 1 for shirking to
be preventable), or the e¤ect on the stock price is low. For certain actions, the private benets
from suboptimal behavior may exceed the upper bound. One example may be managerial en-
trenchment: if the manager fails to resign when it is optimal, he retains his salary (plus private
benets of control) in many future years, the present value of which may plausibly exceed his
annual pay. Another is expansive acquisitions, since Bebchuk and Grinstein (2007) nd that
increases in rm size lead to higher CEO pay in future periods. Moreover, our estimate of $0:9w
hinges upon our chosen input for e (it does not require an estimation ofW=w, since this cancels
out). For actions with smaller e¤ects on the stock price, observed incentives will be too low
to deter misbehavior. In particular, in Section 3.1 we show that actions with additive e¤ects
on rm value have a small impact on equity returns in large rms, and cannot be deterred by
incentives.
To calibrate  as a percentage of wealth, we would need to estimate W=w. Unfortunately,
there is no data available on the wealth W of U.S. CEOs.17 However, ExecuComp provides
data on a CEOs nancial wealth in his own rm. In 1999, we estimate a median value of
Financial wealth in the rm / Pay equal to 9.44. We assume that the CEOs wealth in his
own rm is half his total nancial wealth, and that his human wealth (NPV of future wages)
approximately equals his entire nancial wealth. This leads to an estimate of W=w of 37.8.
We therefore have e = 9 w
W
0:1 ' 0:9
37:8
= 0:024. This means that, if the CEO shirks, his utility
increases by an amount equivalent to 2.4% of his wealth.
Since BII and BIII are mathematically linked to BI , our ability to explain BI means
16Bennedsen, Perez-Gonzalez and Wolfenzon (2007) quantify the value lost from CEO distraction resulting
from family deaths. Since distraction is not an example of wilful misbehavior, we base our calibrations on the
takeover premium.
17We thank David Yermack for discussions on this point. See Becker (2006) for a study with Swedish CEOs.
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that the model can also match these other measures of wealth-performance sensitivity. For
example, BII = BI w
S
. The median size of the top 500 rms in 1999 is $19 billion, with median
pay of $6.2 million. BI = 9 is therefore consistent with a Jensen-Murphy semi-elasticity of
BII = 9  ($6:2 million) = ($19 billion). This represents a wealth rise of $2.94 for a $1; 000
increase in rm value, close to our directly measured gure of $2.62.18
3 Extensions
This section considers extensions and other specications of the model. Section 3.1 shows that
incentives are ine¤ective for deterring actions that are additive in rm value, such as perk
consumption. Section 3.2 extends the model to multiple e¤ort levels and derives a positive
relationship between corporate governance and incentives. In Section 3.3 we show that our
model predicts a positive association between rm volatility and wealth volatility, which we
support empirically. By contrast, traditional frameworks have the opposite prediction. Section
3.4 shows how our model explains the empirical results of Baker and Hall (2004).
3.1 Additive Production Functions and Perks
In the core model, e¤ort has a multiplicative e¤ect on rm value. This allows all incentive
problems to be solvable through the contract specied in Proposition 1 (as long as  < 1).
Since the majority of CEO actions (e.g. strategy choice or process innovation) can be rolled
out across the entire rm, the multiplicative specication likely holds for many managerial
decisions. However, perk consumption in particular is likely to have an additive e¤ect on rm
value. For example, purchasing an unnecessary corporate jet for a dollar value L, or stealing L,
reduces rm value by L regardless of rm size. The following Proposition states that incentives
are unable to deter such actions.
Proposition 8 (Impossibility of deterring perk consumption through incentive pay). Assume
that e¤ort e = e (i.e. perk consumption) reduces rm value by L dollars. Assume that L >
we, so that perk prevention would maximize total surplus. It is impossible to prevent perk
consumption if S > L= (e), i.e. the rm is su¢ ciently large.
Hence if we < L < Se, perk consumption is ine¢ cient but cannot be prevented with
shares.19 Since the perk is xed in absolute terms, the stock price of a large rm is relatively
18$2.94 is di¤erent from the directly-measured number of $2.62, as the median size rm does not have the
median level of incentives. $2.94 is smaller than the $5.29 reported by Hall and Liebman (1998) for 1994, their
nal year, and the $3.25 reported by Jensen and Murphy (1990) because we are considering only the top 500
rms and BII declines with size. Across the whole sample, the median is $8.74.
19Edmans and Gabaix (2008) extend the model to incorporate general incentive contracts and risk aversion.
Perks can be prevented with highly nonlinear contracts, but these impose such high risk on the CEO that total
surplus falls with perk prevention. Thus, it remains the case that incentives are ine¤ective at deterring perks.
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insensitive to perk consumption: stock returns only fall by L=S. Therefore, the CEOs equity
stake does not decline su¢ ciently in dollar terms to outweigh the utility gain of perk consump-
tion. Note that perks cannot be prevented even if the rm is willing to pay the CEO rents (i.e.
salary in excess of w(n)), by awarding him a large number of shares. Raising the CEOs pay
augments his utility from perk consumption (as this equals we) so incentive compatibility is
still not achieved. Another possible solution would be to give the CEO a large equity stake and
reduce his xed salary, to keep his total pay constant, but this is not possible as f  0 owing
to limited liability.
Although seemingly intuitive, this result is contrary to the view modeled by Jensen and
Meckling (1976) and implied by empirical papers such as Jensen and Murphy (1990), that
agency costs can (and should) be addressed by incentive pay. Equity compensation is primar-
ily e¤ective in addressing agency costs that are a proportion of rm value, such as strategy
choice. However, perks are typically independent of rm value, and thus cannot be addressed
by incentives. As with multiplicative actions where  is high, perks should instead be con-
trolled by active corporate governance such as direct monitoring. For example, the board could
intensely scrutinize the purchase of a corporate jet or a large investment project. Empirical
evidence linking governance to shareholder returns (e.g. Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003))
can be interpreted as consistent with this result. If all agency costs could be solved by incentive
compensation, governance would not matter (except for ensuring that the CEO is given the
optimal contract). Since incentive compensation is not universally e¤ective, there remains an
important incremental role for governance, particularly in large rms.
E¤ective monitoring, however, may be di¢ cult to achieve, particularly since governance
may be endogenously chosen by the CEO (e.g. Hermalin and Weisbach (1998)) and so perks
are often consumed in reality (Yermack (2006)). Moreover, governance is primarily e¤ective at
punishing errors of commission (reducing rm value) rather than errors of omission (failing to
take an action that increases rm value). This is because the board is highly unlikely to know
the set of value-enhancing actions the manager can undertake: it cannot punish a CEO for
failing to invent a new product, since it would not have the idea that such a product could be
created. Hence, active monitoring and incentives should be used in tandem: the former to deter
additive value-destructive actions, and the latter to encourage multiplicative value-enhancing
e¤ort.
Overall, incentives are e¤ective in solving large agency problems, which have a signicant
e¤ect on the stock price, but not smaller issues as these do not a¤ect stock returns and thus the
CEOs portfolio. However, these smaller issues are less important for overall rm value. Any
agency problem that would have a substantial e¤ect on rm value also would have a substantial
e¤ect on stock returns, and so incentives are e¤ective. Any agency problem that cannot be
prevented by incentive compensation, because it has too small an e¤ect on stock returns, is
also less value-destructive if unchecked. Therefore, a greater problem for shareholders may be
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an overcondent CEO. His actions may have signicant negative e¤ects on the stock price, yet
incentives may be ine¤ective at deterring them as he genuinely believes that they are maximizing
shareholder value.
3.2 Poor Corporate Governance and Incentives
This section extends the model to a continuum of e¤ort levels. This analysis shows that our
results are not dependent on the binary specication of e¤ort that we used for tractability.
Moreover, it allows us to examine the e¤ect of corporate governance on incentives. As before, the
maximum e¤ort level is optimal. While there are many possible ways to model poor corporate
governance, we represent it as the board setting a target e¤ort level below the maximum.20
In the extended model, the CEO can choose an e¤ort level e 2 [e; e]. The CEOs utility
function is E [cg (e)], where g (e) is decreasing and ln g (e) is concave; the latter is a standard
assumption to ensure that the utility function is log concave. The board sets a target levelbe < e. The next Proposition derives the corresponding incentive level.
Proposition 9 (Negative relationship between governance and incentives). Suppose that the
board wishes to implement an e¤ort level be 2 (e; e). Then board sets an incentive level of:
bI (be) =  g0 (be)
g (be) (1 + be  e) > 0 (27)
%-% incentives bI (be) are increasing in be. The contract comprises a xed base salary of f  =
w
 
1  bI (be) and P0 = bI (be)w worth of shares. To implement be = e, the board must set
bI   g0(e)
g(e)
.
Thus a poorly governed rm will set a lower level of incentives, in turn allowing shirking.
To evaluate this prediction empirically, we proceed as in Table 2 and add the Gompers, Ishii
and Metrick (2003) governance index as an additional explanatory variable in the regression of
BI on rm size. We nd a coe¢ cient of  0:048, with a t-statistic of  2:22, which supports
Proposition 9. The size elasticity becomes 0:01, even closer to the predicted value of 0. The
standard deviation of the governance index is 2.7, implying that a one standard deviation rise
in the index (i.e. a worsening of governance) is associated with BI falling by 13%.
The relationship between governance and incentives may explain the rise in wealth-performance
sensitivity over time (documented by Hall and Liebman (1998), Murphy (1999) and Frydman
and Saks (2007)). Corporate governance has likely strengthened in recent years from changes
resulting from recommendations and legislation (such as the 1992 Cadbury Report and the 2002
Sarbanes-Oxley Act), changes enforced by activist shareholders (see, e.g., Carleton, Nelson and
20Note that allowing shirking is a costly way to favor the CEO, since shirking has a multiplicative e¤ect on rm
value. A more e¢ cient method would be to maintain optimal incentives, but to give the manager superuous
cash.
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Weisbach (1998)) or voluntary changes resulting from increased investor and media scrutiny of
governance, such as the removal of board interlocks. Improvements in corporate governance will
lead to a rise in be and thus an increase in incentives. In addition, deregulation and globalization
have plausibly increased the managers scope for creating value. This augments e and thus the
optimal wealth-performance sensitivity.21
3.3 The Link Between CEO Wealth Volatility and Firm Volatility
This section contrasts the opposite predictions of our model and standard models for the rela-
tionship between wealth volatility and rm volatility. Our model predicts a positive association,
which we support empirically. However, standard models feature a trade-o¤ between incentives
and risk, thus implying a negative correlation.
We rst review the trade-o¤prediction of standard models. One variant features additive
preferences and a multiplicative production function, but we later also consider additive pro-
duction functions. To simplify the exposition, we use the certainty-equivalent representation of
the model. The CEO has utility u = E[c]  a
2
var (c)  1
2
e2, where a denotes absolute risk aver-
sion and e 2 [0;1). His reservation utility is u. Firm value next period is S1 = S (1 + Le+ ),
where L measures the productivity of e¤ort and  is normal noise with mean 0 and variance
2r. The rm maximizes S (1 + Le) E [c], its expected value next period net of CEO pay. As
before, compensation comprises xed pay f , plus  shares.
Under this model, the optimal $-$ incentives are bII = @c=@S1 = L= (L2 + a2r), and thus
decreasing in rm volatility.22 This arises because there is always an interior solution to the
optimal e¤ort level, and so it reects a trade-o¤ between risk and incentives at the margin.
As r rises, incentives impose even higher costs on the manager, and thus the optimal level is
lower.
In addition to predicting a negative relationship between bII and r, standard models
also predict a negative relationship between pay volatility and rm volatility. Since pay
volatility is stdev (c) = r = rSL= (L2 + a2r), its sensitivity to rm volatility is given by
@stdev (c) =@r =  S
 
1  2bII bII . Since empirical studies nd that bII is substantially less
than 1=2, these models predict @stdev (c) =@r < 0, i.e. that CEO wealth volatility declines in
rm volatility.23
21Note that the rise in incentives may also be for reasons outside the model. For example, until recently,
at-the-money options did not need to be expensed and thus may have been used as hidden compensation.
Alternatively, they may have been a mechanism to avoid the additional tax liability caused by granting a cash
salary in excess of $1 million.
22Normalizing the initial share price to P0 = 1, the CEOs realized pay is c = f +  (1 + Le+ ). The CEO
chooses e to maximize his utility, u = f +  (1 + Le)  a22r2   12e2, and selects e = L. The rm chooses  to
maximize its net value, S
 
1 + L2
  a22r2   2L22 , and selects  = SL2=  L2 + a2r. The CEOs total pay is
therefore c = f + S1L=
 
L2 + a2r

.
23The standard model is expressed in terms of terminal consumption, but its general meaning is in terms of
terminal wealth. The key variable is the NPV of the CEOs future utilities in the second period, which is also
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By contrast, in our model there is a corner solution to e¤ort and so the number of shares 
is independent of volatility. Hence stdev (c) = r is increasing in volatility. Indeed, we predict
that the CEOs wealth volatility is proportional to rm volatility, i.e.
stdev(Wt+1  Wt) = BIIIr / Sr; (28)
where r is the volatility of the rms returns and  = 1=3 is the elasticity of pay with respect
to size (see Proposition 4).
We evaluate these contrasting predictions empirically. As discussed more fully in Appendix
D, there are two main ways to estimate wealth volatility, stdev(Wt+1  Wt). The rst is the
ex ante measure used in Section 2, i.e. stdev(Wt+1  Wt) = BIIIt r.24 The second uses ex post
realized volatility, i.e. stdev(Wt+1   Wt) = ln jWt+1  Wtj. We calculate wealth by starting
with the CEOs initial holdings of stock and options and, each year, adding the appreciation
in value of this portfolio plus any new ow compensation. We do not have data on the CEOs
wealth outside of his rm. In both cases, the model predicts that regressing stdev(Wt+1 Wt) =
S lnS + S lnr will yield S = 1=3 and  = 1.
We can also scale the dependent variable. Scaling by the wage leads toBIt r or ln (jWt+1  Wtj =wt)
and the model predicts S = 0 and  = 1. Scaling by size yields B
II
t r or ln (jWt+1  Wtj =St),
with a prediction of S =  2=3 and  = 1.
Insert Table 3 about here
The results are shown in Table 3. In all six specications we nd that wealth volatility is
signicantly increasing in rm volatility. In three specications, we cannot reject the hypothesis
that  = 1. (The low  = 0:64 when ln (jWt+1  Wtj =wt) is the dependent variable is because
of the strong positive association between wt and r.) In addition, in all six specications, the
95% condence intervals for S contain the predicted values.
We now detail the origins of the contrasting predictions. In our model, incentives ensure
maximum e¤ort regardless of the cost imposed on the manager. There is a corner solution and
no trade-o¤: since the rm (and thus the benets of e¤ort) is much larger than the manager
(and thus the cost of incentives)25, it is always e¢ cient to implement the maximum level of
e¤ort. Simply put, risk does not a¤ect incentives because it is second-order.
The absence of a trade-o¤ results from two features of our model: the existence of a max-
imum e¤ort level, and a multiplicative production function which means that maximum e¤ort
is optimal. A maximum will exist either because there is a limit to the number of productive
linear in wealth in the standard model.
24Indeed, for small time intervals, Wt+1  Wt =W 0t (r) rt = BIIIrt, so stdev(Wt+1  Wt) = BIIIstdev (rt) =
BIIIr.
25In this paper, the only cost of incentives is the direct disutility from working. In Edmans and Gabaix (2008)
we show that introducing risk aversion does not change this result. The intuition is as in the core model: the
cost of risk-bearing is a function of the manager, and thus much smaller than the benets of e¤ort.
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activities that a CEO can undertake (e.g. nite NPV-positive projects) or a limit to the number
of hours in a day the CEO can optimally work. Models with binary e¤ort levels also assume a
maximum; our model is more general as it allows for intermediate e¤ort levels (see Section 3.2).
Introducing a maximum e into the standard model with a multiplicative production function
and additive preferences would also generate a corner solution if SL3= (L2 + a2r) > e. With an
additive production function (S1 = S+Le+ ), the required condition is L3= (L2 + a2rS
2) > e
and is less likely to be satised for large rms. Hence, the combination of a maximum e¤ort
level and a multiplicative production function is necessary to remove any trade-o¤s.
Consistent with our evidence, Prendergasts (2002) survey nds that most studies detect
no relationship between incentives and rm risk, with the remainder equally divided between
reporting positive and negative associations. He models an explanation based on the allocation
of responsibility to employees; ours is based on the observation that the cost of risk is very
small relative to the rm, so that trade-o¤ considerations are insignicant. Our model provides
another explanation for Prendergasts puzzle.
3.4 Explaining Baker-Hall
Finally, we illustrate how our model can explain Baker and Halls (2004) empirical results
on the negative relationship between BII and rm size. They assume additive preferences,
which requires L (the productivity of e¤ort) to be size-dependent for BII to decline with size.
They therefore use their results to back out the required scaling of L with size. In our model,
preferences and production functions are motivated by rst principles. We demonstrate that
these specications can generate the empirical scalings.
Baker and Hall estimate a functional form for L(e; S). They derive an equation for I, the
CEOs dollar productivity, as a function of rm size; in our notation, I = LS. Their equation
(3) predicts IBH =
q
2bIIa
1 bII rS, where a is the coe¢ cient of absolute risk aversion. They assume
constant relative risk aversion, and so a is inversely proportional to the CEOs wealth.
They then make one of three assumptions for the scaling of the CEOs wealth, which leads
to three di¤erent specications. In their specication (1), they assume wealth is proportional to
the CEOs wage, and so a / w 1. In their specication (2), they assume wealth is proportional
to the CEOs wealth invested in the rm, and so a / W 1. Since w / W empirically (see
section 1.4), specications (1) and (2) both lead to a / w 1.
In our model, w / S and so a / 1=w / S . In addition, bII / w=S / S 1 and
1   bII / S0, since bII  1. Assuming stock price volatility is independent of rm size (as
in the geometric random growth model),26 the standard deviation of the dollar value of a rm
is r / S1. We therefore predict IBH1 / S( 1 )=2+1 = S1=2. Our predicted elasticity of 12 is
consistent with Baker and Halls empirical nding of 0.4.
26Regressing log volatility on log aggregate value, year dummies and industry dummies yields an insignicant
coe¢ cient of -0.0019 (standard error of 0.0124).
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In their specication (3), they assume the CEOs wealth is independent of size, and therefore
a / S0. In our model, this would lead to IBH3 / S( 1)=2+1 = S(1+)=2 = S2=3, using  = 1=3,
and thus a predicted elasticity of 0.67. Baker and Hall nd an elasticity of 0.62. We therefore
conclude that the Baker and Hall empirical results can also be quantitatively explained by our
model.
4 Conclusion
This model studies optimal executive compensation in a setting with two unique features. First,
motivated by rst principles, we depart from traditional additive specications and assume
that e¤ort has a multiplicative e¤ect on both rm value and CEO utility. Second, while
principal-agent models are typically partial equilibrium and focus on the composition of a xed
level of total pay, we endogenize salary by embedding the agency problem in a competitive
assignment model. The unied framework has a number of empirical implications which di¤er
from standard models with linear functional forms:
(i) Dollar-dollar incentives optimally decline with rm size, with an elasticity of -2/3. There-
fore, the negative scaling observed empirically is fully consistent with optimal contracting and
need not reect ine¢ ciency. Relatedly, dollar-percent incentives should have a size elasticity of
1/3.
(ii) Scaled wealth-performance sensitivity (percent-percent incentives, i.e. the dollar change
in wealth for a percentage change in rm value, scaled by annual pay) is invariant to rm size.
(iii) Observed levels of wealth-performance sensitivity (percent-percent incentives) are su¢ -
cient to deter value-destructive actions that yield private benets no greater than 0.9 times the
annual wage. Similarly, the level of dollar-dollar incentives should be very small, as empirically
documented by Jensen-Murphy (1990).
(iv) Increased rm volatility is associated with increased wealth volatility, but does not
a¤ect the incentive component of total pay.
(v) Incentive compensation is typically e¤ective at deterring value-destructive actions that
have a large multiplicative e¤ect on rm value. It is ine¤ective at preventing actions with a
xed dollar e¤ect on rm value, particularly in large companies.
While our model shows that a number of observed features of compensation are consistent
with an optimal contracting model, there are number of stylized facts upon which the model
is silent, such as the use of pensions and other forms of hidden compensation, the use of
accounting-based compensation (such as bonuses) and severance pay. Equally, there are many
other determinants of compensation that the model does not consider, such as risk, stockholder-
bondholder conicts, screening of ability, managerial entrenchment, and the inducement of
innovation. Owing to its tractability and empirical consistency, our model may provide a useful
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benchmark on which future models can be built to explore these additional determinants. The
resulting empirical predictions can be compared with the above stylized facts to assess whether
they are consistent with optimal contracting or instead result from rent extraction. In addition,
there are a number of implications of the current model which we have not yet tested. Are
our scalings empirically consistent in other countries, or are there large discrepancies that may
be potential evidence of ine¢ ciencies? Are CEO incentives increasing in wealth?27 How much
of the time series variation in incentives, documented by Frydman and Saks (2007), can be
explained by our model?
One important caveat is that we used the empirical consistency of our models predictions to
justify our assumed functional form, and in turn to support our advocacy of BI as an empirical
measure. However, using real-world data to evaluate a frictionless model implicitly assumes
that real-world practices are also reasonably close to frictionless. It could be that an alterna-
tive model, with di¤erent specications to ours and predicting the size invariance of a di¤erent
measure, represents the truefrictionless benchmark, and that this alternative model is empir-
ically rejected because there are indeed ine¢ ciencies in reality. Perhaps under the hypothetical
truespecication, BI should optimally increase with rm size, and we only observe that it is
constant because ine¢ ciencies are greater in large rms. Further research is needed to evaluate
this hypothesis. In particular, the strongest support for the rent extraction view may come
not from observing that a particular practice is inconsistent with a frictionless model, but from
deriving a model that explicitly incorporates frictions and generates quantitative predictions
on their e¤ects on compensation that closely match the data. Our empirical results suggest
that, if the true specication predicts that BI increases with rm size, ine¢ ciencies would
have to scale with rm size in such a way as to exactly counterbalance the optimal scaling and
explain the size invariance of BI that we nd. For now, our neoclassical benchmark shows that
ine¢ ciencies do not need to be assumed when interpreting various features of the data.
A Detailed Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1 On the equilibrium path (where he exerts a high e¤ort e), the
manager should earn his market wage: E [c j e = e] = w. Using c = f + vP1, we calculate:
E [c j e = e] = f + E[P1] = f + vP0 = w
E [c j e = 0] = f + E[P1] (1  e) = f + P0 (1  e) = f + P0   P0e = w   P0e:
27Given data limitations in the U.S., the only wealth data available is on the CEOs stock and options holdings
in his own rm, and so there is a mechanical link between incentives and measured wealth. However, full wealth
data may be available in other countries (see Becker (2006) for an example).
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The manager chooses e = e if:
E [cg (e) j e = e]  E [cg (0) j e = 0] :
Since g (e) = 1 and g (0) = 1
1 e , this incentive-compatibility constraint writes:
w  w   P0e
1  e , P0  w = 
P0:
f  is chosen to ensure that expected pay is w: f  = w   P0 = w (1  ).
Proof of Proposition 2 Once a CEO is assigned to a rm, they reach the e¢ cient out-
come, which is to implement the high level of e¤ort. Hence, the incentive scheme of Proposition
1 applies.
To endogenize the wage, we rst dene some notation. A continuum of rms and potential
managers are matched together. Firm n 2 [0; N ] has size S (n) and manager m 2 [0; N ] has
talent T (m). Low n denotes a larger rm and low m a more talented manager: S 0 (n) < 0,
T 0 (m) < 0. n (m) can be thought of as the rank of the manager (rm), or a number proportional
to it, such as its quantile of rank.
We consider the problem faced by one particular rm. The rm has a baselinevalue of
S. At t = 0, it hires a manager of talent T for one period. The managers talent increases the
rms value according to
S 0 = S + CTS; (29)
where C parameterizes the productivity of talent. If large rms are more di¢ cult to change
than small rms, then  < 1. If  = 1, the model exhibits constant returns to scale (CRS) with
respect to rm size.
We now determine equilibrium wages, which requires us to allocate one CEO to each rm.
Let w (m) denote the equilibrium compensation of a CEO with index m. Firm n, taking the
market compensation of CEOs as given, selects manager m to maximize its value net of wages:
max
m
CS (n) T (m)  w (m) :
The competitive equilibrium involves positive assortative matching, i.e. m = n, and so
w0 (n) = CS (n) T 0 (n). Let wN denote the reservation wage of the least talented CEO (n = N).
Hence we obtain the classic assignment equation (Sattinger (1993), Tervio (2007)):
w (n) =  
Z N
n
CS (u) T 0 (u) du+ wN : (30)
Specic functional forms are required to proceed further. We assume a Pareto rm size
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distribution with exponent 1=: S (n) = An . Using results from extreme value theory, GL
use the following asymptotic value for the spacings of the talent distribution: T 0 (n) =  Bn 1.
These functional forms give the wage equation in closed form, taking the limit as n=N ! 0:
w (n) =
Z N
n
ABCu + 1du+ w =
ABC
   

n ( )  N ( )+ wN  ABC   n ( ):
(31)
To interpret equation (31), we consider a reference rm, for instance rm number 250 the
median rm in the universe of the top 500 rms. Denote its index n, and its size S(n). We ob-
tain Proposition 2 from GL, which we repeat here. In equilibrium, manager n runs a rm of size
S (n), and is paid according to the dual scalingequation w (n) = D (n)S(n)=S (n)
 =,
where S(n) is the size of the reference rm and D (n) =  CnT 0 (n) = (   ) is a constant
independent of rm size.28
Proof of Proposition 5 Take the denition of bII and use  =    =:
bII = 
w
S
= 
D (n)S(n)=S =
S (n)
/ S
 = 1
S(n) =
=
S 1
S(n) 
= S (1 )S (n)
  :
The expressions for bI and bIII obtain similarly.
Proof of Proposition 7 Dene  (c) = u (c; e), g (e) = 1 and g (0) = 1=
 
1  bIe. Since
bI achieves the minimum slope while maintaining incentive compatibility, E [u (c; e) j e = 0] =
E [u (c; e) j e = e], i.e.
u
 
w
 
1  bIe ; 0 = u (w; e) =  (w)
and so u (c; 0) = 
 
c=
 
1  bIe =  (cg (0)). Therefore, u (c; e) =  (cg (e)) for all c and
e 2 f0; eg.
The converse of the proof is immediate (and is similar to Proposition 1), with bI = (1  g (e) =g (0)) =e.
28The derivation is as follows. Since S = An , S(n) = An  , nT
0 (n) =  Bn , we can rewrite equation
(31) as follows:
(   )w (n) = ABCn ( ) = CBn 
 
An 
=   An ( =)
=  CnT 0 (n)S(n)=S (n) = :
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Proof of Proposition 8 If perk consumption occurs, E [P1] = S   L, else E [P1] = S.
To deter perk consumption, we require that the CEOs utility is greater under high e¤ort:
f + S  f + 
 
S   L
1  e :
Therefore 
 
L  Se  fe. Since f  0 and   0, this cannot be satised if S > L= (e).
Finally, perk consumption is ine¢ cient if and only if L > we, by the same reasoning as in
footnote 5.
Proof of Proposition 9 As P1 = S (1 + ) (1 + e  e), and the market correctly antici-
pates that e¤ort level be is implemented, the initial price is P0 = E [P1 j e = be] = S (1 + e  be).
The rm return is r = P1=P0   1. Hence, if the CEO exerts e¤ort e, the expected return is:
E [r j e] = e  be
1 + be  e (32)
Suppose that the CEO receives P0 in shares, w   P0 is cash. His consumption is:
c = w   P0 + P1 = w   P0 + vP0 (1 + r) = w

1 +
P0
w
r

= w
 
1 + bIr

:
As before, bI = P0
w
. Hence the CEOs expected utility is:
E [cg (e) j e] = wg (e)

1 + bI
e  be
1 + be  e

:
The CEO chooses the e¤ort be = argmaxeE [cg (e) j e] if and only if:
wg0 (be) + wg (be) bI 1
1 + be  e = 0:
B Multiperiod Model
This Appendix underpins Section 1.4, which extends the pay-performance sensitivity results of
Sections 1.1-1.3 to wealth-performance sensitivity in an intertemporal framework. It shows that
the key results of the one-period model still hold: since e¤ort continues to have multiplicative
costs and benets, %-% incentives remain relevant.
As in the core model, we retain risk neutrality (aside for when choosing from a continuum
of incentive compatible contracts) but also require an incentive to smooth consumption over
time to create a meaningful intertemporal model. Therefore, we use the framework of Epstein-
Zin (1990) and Weil (1989), which allows us to disentangle risk aversion and intertemporal
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substitution.29
Let Wt denote the CEOs wealth, and the value function Vt denote the discounted utility of
future consumption:
lnVt = (1  ) ln (ct) +  lnEt [Vt+1]  ett:
For instance, if consumption and e¤ort are deterministic, lnVt =
P1
s=0 
s ((1  ) ln ct+s   et+s).
Note that this still in essence a multiplicative model, like (1) and (23). The model is most suited
for continuous time analysis, but for expositional clarity, we proceed in discrete time and take
the continuous time limit where applicable.
With a logarithmic utility function, a standard result is that the indirect utility of wealth
is lnVt = lnWt + k, where k is a constant independent of wealth. Therefore, the optimal
consumption policy is ct = (1  )Wt.
The CEO has a fraction t of his wealth in the rm. The rms return is rt+1 = rf + et  
e + t+1, where rf is the risk-free rate and et 2 f0; eg and t+1 is a mean random shock. The
CEOs wealth evolves according to:
Wt+1 = Wt
 
1 + rf + t (et   e) + tt+1
  ct+1: (33)
If the CEO shirks at time t, he increases his utility lnVt by et. On the other hand,
his wealth at t + 1 is reduced by Wt =  Wr (t) et;where Wr = @W=@r. (In our example,
Wr = W.) Therefore, shirking increases utility lnVt by:
 lnVt = et+ln (Wt +Wt) lnWt = et+ln

1  Wr (t) et
Wt

= et

  Wr (t)
Wt

+o (t) :
We take the continuous time limit, t! 0. The CEO does not shirk if and only if  Wr(t)
Wt
 0,
i.e.:
@W
@r
 W (34)
As in Section 1, we select the contract that minimizes the risk in the CEOs pay. It is given by
@W
@r
= W: (35)
Using Denition 2, the wealth-performance sensitivities in Proposition 6 can be easily de-
rived.
29Risk neutrality signicantly enhances tractability. Without smooth consumption, the model would be
degenerate as the CEO consumes everything in a period in which he shirks.
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C Options and Nonlinear Incentive Contracts
We return to the basic model with a binary e¤ort decision, and generalize from stocks to a
broader range of compensation instruments. The CEO receives xed pay f , and  units of a
security; one unit of the security pays V (P1). For instance, for an option with strike K,
V (P1) = max (0; P1  K). Total compensation is c = f + V (P1).
In equilibrium, the CEO should be paid w  E [cg (e) j e = e]. If the CEO shirks (e = e 
0), the CEOs utility is, calling P1 the value of P1 achieved if CEO exerts high e¤ort.
E [cg (0) j e = 0] = E [f + V (P1(1  e))] g (0) = E [f + V (P1)  e] g (0)
= (w   e) = (1  e) ;
with
  (E [V (P1)]  E [V (P1(1  e))]) =e: (36)
Hence, the CEO works if E [cg (e) j e = e]  E [cg (0) j e = 0], i.e.
w  (w   e) = (1  e),    = w

:
This leads to the following generalization of Proposition 1.
Proposition 10 (General incentive contracts). Using nonlinear incentive contracts, the con-
clusions of Proposition 1 remain the same, with a change of notation. The managers expected
pay is w, which comprises xed base salary f , and E [V (P1)] worth of securities, with:
Incentivized pay = E [V (P1)] = w0; (37)
Fixed pay = f  = w (1  0) ;
where 0 = E [V (P1)] =,  = w  , and  is in (36). Realized pay is:
c = w +  (V (P1)  E [V (P1)]) :
Regressing the ex post compensation c on the rm return r = P1=P0   1 yields,
bIII =
@E [c]
@r
= E

@V (P0 (1 + r))
@r

= P0E [V 0 (P1)] = w


P0E [V
0 (P1)] = w;
with
 =
P0E [V
0 (P1)]

: (38)
For instance, if the security is a stock, V (P ) = P ,  = 1, E [V 0 (P1)] = 1, and  = 1. For
small P1=P0   1 and e; by Taylor expansion, ! E [V 0 (P1)]P0, and  ! 1. We can therefore
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think of  as approaching 1, and so the broader economics are unchanged.
Proposition 11 Using general incentive contracts, the conclusions of Proposition 3 remain
the same, modied only by the introduction of a parameter . The pay-performance sensitivities
are:
bIn = 

L
bIIn = 

L
wn
Sn
bIIIn = 

L
wn;
with  given in (38). In many cases,  ' 1. Proposition 4 remains exactly the same.
D Detailed Calculation of BI
We merge Compustat with ExecuComp (1992-2006) and each year select the 500 largest rms
by aggregate value (equity plus debt). To calculate aggregate value, we rst multiply the end-
of-year share price (data199) with the number of shares outstanding (data25) to obtain market
equity. To this we add the value of the rms debt, calculated as total assets (data) minus
total common equity (data60). If non-missing, we also subtract balance sheet deferred taxes
(data74). We call this variable aggval, and it is in millions of dollars.
The CEOs incentives are calculated at the end of each scal year, and stem from his stock
and option holdings. The number of shares held by the CEO is given by ExecuComp variable
shrown. Obviously, each share has a delta of 1; the delta of an option is given by the Black-
Scholes formula:
e dTN
0@ ln   SX +

r   d+ 2
2

T

p
T
1A :
d is the continuously compounded expected dividend yield, given by bs_yield. If this is
missing, we assume it is zero. We also winsorize it at the 95th percentile for each year.
 is the expected volatility of the stock return, given by bs_volatility. If it is missing, we
replace it with the median volatility for that year. We also winsorize  at the 5th and 95th
percentile for each year.
r is the continuously compounded risk-free rate, available from http://wrds1.wharton.upenn.edu
/ds/comp/execcomp/means.html.
S is the stock price at the end of the scal year, given by prccf.
X is the strike price of the option.
T is the maturity of the option.
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The option holdings come in three categories: new grants, existing unexercisable grants, and
existing exercisable grants. The rst four variables in the Black-Scholes formula are available
for all categories. For new grants, X and T are also available. X is given by expric (if this is
missing, we set it equal to the stock price at the end of the scal year), and T can be calculated
using the options maturity date, exdate. If exdate is unavailable, we assume a maturity of 9.5
years. (Standard options have a 10 year maturity; we assume the average option is granted
mid-way through the year). A CEO may receive multiple new grants in each year. We calculate
the delta of each option grant, multiply it by the number of options in the grant (numsecur) and
sum across grants to calculate totaldeltanew, the dollar change in the CEOs newly granted
options for a $1 increase in the stock price. Similarly, we sum numsecur across grants to calculate
numnewop, the total number of newly granted options. While ExecuComp has a variable
(option_awards_num) for the number of newly granted options, it is sometimes di¤erent from
the number obtained by summing across grants, because numsecur is sometimes missing. As
will become clear later, using the bottom-upnumber numnewop is more internally consistent
since we are calculating the intrinsic value of new grants on a bottom-upbasis.
X and T are not directly available for previously granted options, so we use the methodology
of Core and Guay (2002). Here we summarize the Core and Guay method while stating the
additional assumptions made when data issues were encountered. Since new grants are nearly
always unexercisable, Core and Guay recommend calculating the strike price of unexercisable
options as
prccf -
opt_unex_unexer_est_val - ivnew
opt_unex_unexer_num - numnewop
:
opt_unex_unexer_est_val is the intrinsic value of the unexercisable options held at the
end of the year, some of which stem from newly granted options.
ivnew is the intrinsic value of the newly granted options. This is not directly available from
ExecuComp, but obtained by calculating max(0,(prccf-expric)) * numsecur for each new grant
and summing across new grants.
opt_unex_unexer_num is the number of unexercisable options held at the end of the year.
Again because new grants are nearly always unexercisable, Core and Guay recommend
calculating the strike price of exercisable options as
prccf -
opt_unex_exer_est_val
opt_unex_exer_num
:
opt_unex_exer_est_val is the intrinsic value of the exercisable options held at the end of
the year.
opt_unex_exer_num is the number of exercisable options held at the end of the year.
In some cases, numnewop > opt_unex_unexer_num, i.e. the number of newly granted
options exceeds the number of unexercisable options at year end. As in Core and Guay (2002),
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we interpret these cases as part of the new grant (numnewop - opt_unex_unexer_num) being
exercisable. We therefore calculate the strike price of exercisable options as
prccf 
opt_unex_exer_est_val
opt_unex_exer_num - (numnewop - opt_unex_unexer_num)
:
In a subset of these cases, numnewop > opt_unex_unexer_num + opt_unex_exer_num,
i.e. the number of newly granted options exceeds the number of total options at year end.30 In
such cases, we assume that some of the new options were exercisable, and that the CEO had
already exercised them during the year.31
In some cases, ivnew > opt_unex_unexer_est_val, i.e. the intrinsic value of the newly
granted options exceeds the intrinsic value of unexercisable options. In a subset of these cases,
opt_unex_unexer_num > numnewop, i.e. there are some previously granted unexercisable
options. We assume that such options are at the money. If ivnew > opt_unex_unexer_est_val
and numnewop > opt_unex_unexer_num, we interpret this as part of the new grant being
exercisable and having intrinsic value. In such cases, we calculate the strike price of exercisable
options as
prccf 
opt_unex_exer_est_val - (ivnew - opt_unex_unexer_est_val)
opt_unex_exer_num - (numnewop - opt_unex_unexer_num)
:
If ivnew> opt_unex_exer_est_val + opt_unex_unexer_est_val but opt_unex_exer_num
> numnewop - opt_unex_unexer_num (i.e. there are some previously granted exercisable op-
tions), we assume that these options are at the money.
For the option maturities, Core and Guay recommend assuming a maturity for previously
granted, unexercisable options of one year less than the maturity of newly granted options, if
there were new grants in the scal year. (Where there are multiple grants, we take the longest
maturity option). If there were no new grants, we use 8.5 years.32 The maturity of exercisable
options is assumed to be 3 years less than for unexercisable options. If this leads to a negative
maturity, we assume a maturity of 1 day. As in Core, Guay and Verrecchia (2003), we then
multiply the maturities of all options by 70%, to capture the fact that CEOs typically exercise
options prior to maturity.
We use these estimated strike prices and maturities to calculate deltaun, the delta for
previously granted, unexercisable options, and deltaex, the delta for previously granted,
30We checked selected cases against the original SEC form 14a lings. In some cases, this was due to inaccurate
data entry by ExecuComp (in particular, ExecuComp reporting dollar rather than number amounts for the
quantity of options). However, in other cases, ExecuComp reported accurately, hence the interpretation in the
next sentence.
31Hence, we assume there are opt_unex_unexer_num unexercisable options with a strike price of
prccf - opt_unex_unexer_est_valopt_unex_unexer_num , and opt_unex_exer_num exercisable options with a strike price of prccf -
opt_unex_exer_est_val
opt_unex_exer_num :
32Core and Guay (2002) recommend 9 years. We use 8.5 because we assume the the average new grant is
given half-way through the scal year and thus has a maturity of 9.5 years.
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exercisable options. In the very few cases where delta cannot be calculated because prccf is
missing, we set deltaun and deltaex to 0.7 as estimated by Guay (1999).
Putting this all together, the dollar change (in millions) in the CEOs wealth for a $1 change
in the stock price is given by
totaldelta = [shrown + totaldeltanew + max(0,opt_unex_unexer_num-numnewop)  deltaun
+max(0,(opt_unex_exer_num-max(0,numnewop-opt_unex_unexer_num)))
 deltaex]/1000
=
1
P

Value of stock + Number of options @V
@P
 P

where V is the value of one option, @V
@P
is the option delta, and P is the stock price.
We then calculate our measures of wealth-performance sensitivity, deating all nominal vari-
ables using the GDP deator from the Bureau of Economic Analysis website (http://www.bea.gov/
national/xls/gdplev.xls):
BIII = totaldelta  prccf
BII =
BIII
aggval
 1000
BI =
BIII
tdc1
 1000:
Since tdc1 is very low (and sometimes zero) in a few observations, we replace such observa-
tions by the 2nd percentile for that year. The units for BII are the dollar increase in the CEOs
wealth for a $1,000 dollar increase in shareholder value, as in Jensen and Murphy (1990).
Note that these ex antemeasures slightly underestimate wealth-performance sensitivity,
since they omit changes in ow compensation. However, this discrepancy is likely to be small:
Hall and Liebman (1998) and Core, Guay and Verrecchia (2003) nd that the bulk of incentives
comes from changes in the value of a CEOs existing portfolio. If the researcher has data on
the CEOs entire wealth, BI can be estimated using ex post changes in wealth as follows:
Wt+1  Wt
wt
= A+ cBI  rt+1 + C  rM;t+1 + Controls, (39)
where Wt+1   Wt is the change in wealth and rM;t+1 is the market return (returns on other
factors could also be added).33
Even if full wealth data (which includes ow compensation) is available, the ex ante measure
33rM;t+1 is added since the CEO may hold investments other than his own rms securities, that move with
the market but not the rms return. For example, consider a CEO whose wealth is entirely invested in the
market, with no sensitivity to rms idiosyncratic return. If equation (39) did not contain the C  rM;t+1 term,
it would incorrectly nd cBI > 0, whereas the true cBI is zero. Since rt+1 proxies for rM;t+1, there is an omitted
variables bias which leads to BI being overestimated.
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has a number of advantages. First, both data on overall wealth and a long time series are
required to estimate equation (39) accurately. Second, even if such data is available, ex post
measures inevitably assume that wealth-performance sensitivity is constant over the time period
used to calculate the measure. Since the ex ante statistic more accurately captures the CEOs
incentives at a particular point in time, it is especially useful as a regressor since its time period
can be made consistent with the dependent variable. For example, in a regression of M&A
announcement returns on wealth-performance sensitivity (e.g. Morck, Shleifer and Vishny
(1990)), the CEOs incentives can be measured in the same year in which the transaction
was announced. In a similar vein, the ex ante measure is more suited to measuring trends in
executive compensation over time.
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Table 1: Comparing Di¤erent Measures of Incentives.
bI bII bIII
PPS
 ln c
 lnS
c
S
c
 lnS
Real variables $sharestotal pay % shares $ shares
WPS analog
$W
 lnS
1
w
$W
$S
$W
 lnS
Used by Murphy (1985) Demsetz-Lehn (1985) Holmstrom (1992)
Gibbons-Murphy (1992) Jensen-Murphy (1990) Hall-Liebman (1998)
Rosen (1992) Yermack (1995)
Schaefer (1998)
This paper  
w
S
w
Scaling with S bI / S0 bII / S 1 bIII / S
bI / S0 bII / S 2=3 bIII / S1=3
Scaling with S(n) bI / S0S(n)0 bII / S (1 )S (n)  bIII / SS (n) 
bI / S0S(n)0 bII / S 2=3S (n)2=3 bIII / S1=3S (n)2=3
Explanation: This Table shows the three di¤erent measures of pay-performance sensitivity
(PPS) and wealth-performance sensitivity (WPS). c is the realized compensation, w is the
expected compensation, S is the aggregate value of the rm, W is CEO wealth, and  is the
cost of e¤ort.  is the cross-sectional elasticity of expected pay to rm size (w / S) and
empirically is approximately  = 1=3. The predictions in this table are from Propositions 3, 4
and 5. The symbol /denotes is proportional to. For instance, bII / S 2=3 means that we
predict that bII declines with size S, with an elasticity of -2/3, and bI / S0 means that bI is
constant across rm sizes.
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Table 2: Elasticities of Wealth-Performance Sensitivity with Firm Size.
ln(BI) ln(BII) ln(BIII)
ln(Aggregate Value) 0.0380 -0.6023 0.3977
(0.0677) (0.0520) (0.0520)
Year Fixed E¤ects Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed E¤ects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6,470 6,470 6,470
Adj. R-squared 0.1323 0.3176 0.3444
Explanation: We merge Compustat with ExecuComp (1992-2006) and select the 500 largest
rms each year by aggregate value (debt plus equity). We use the Core and Guay (2002)
methodology to estimate the delta of the CEOs option holdings. BI , BII andBIII are estimated
using equations (24)-(26). The industries are the Fama-French (1997) 48 sectors. Standard
errors, displayed in parentheses, are clustered at the rm level. The model predicts a coe¢ cient
of  = 0 for BI ,  =  2=3 for BII , and  = 1=3 for BIII :
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Table 3: The Positive Relation between Wealth Volatility and Firm Volatility.
Ex ante measure of volatility Ex post measure of volatility
ln(BIr) ln(B
IIr) ln(B
IIIr) ln

jWt+1 Wtj
wt

ln

jWt+1 Wtj
St

ln jWt+1  Wtj
ln(Return Vol) 0.9979 1.3632 1.3632 0.6831 0.9885 1.0635
(0.1305) (0.1196) (0.1196) (0.1633) (0.1389) (0.1423)
ln(Agg. Value) 0.0242 -0.5848 0.4152 -0.0487 -0.6202 0.2960
(0.0581) (0.0479) (0.0479) (0.0639) (0.0512) (0.0523)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6,276 6,276 6,276 4,545 4,545 4,545
Adj. R-squared 0.2238 0.4508 0.4508 0.1390 0.3200 0.2870
Explanation: We merge Compustat with ExecuComp (1992-2006) and select the 500 largest
rms each year by aggregate value (debt plus equity). We use the Core and Guay (2002) method-
ology to estimate the delta of the CEOs option holdings. BI , BII and BIII are estimated using
equations (24)-(26). The industries are the Fama-French (1997) 48 sectors. Standard errors,
displayed in parentheses, are clustered at the rm level. The model predicts a coe¢ cient of 1
on ln(Return Volatility), whereas models with unbounded e¤ort predict a negative coe¢ cient.
The theory also predicts a coe¢ cient on ln(Aggregate Value) of  = 0 for BI ,  =  2=3 for BII
and  = 1=3 for BIII .
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